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CURRENT DECISIONS
tion from these vehicles in the event of an accident, and any judicial
precedent which holds that accidents, an extremely grim element of our
daily existence, are not "intended uses" of automobiles is unwise and
unrealistic. It is hoped that the Badorek decision, by virtue of its origin
in the California courts, will serve as a ballast to the Larsen view and
will mark a distinct turn against unreasonable refusals to extend the
doctrine of strict liability in tort.
DANIEL J. PERRY
Securities Regulation-APPLICATION OF SECTION 16 (b) -BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP LIABILITY FOR SHORT-SWING PROFITS. Emerson Electric
Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970).
Emerson Electric Company, which owned no stock in the target
corporation, acquired more than ten percent of Dodge Manufacturing
Corporation's stock on June 16, 1967 1 When its merger efforts failed,
Emerson reduced its Dodge holding to less than ten percent. On Sep-
tember 11, 1967, after Dodge had merged with Reliance Electric Com-
pany, Emerson sold the remaining shares to Reliance.2 Emerson msd-
tuted a declaratory judgment action to determine its liability under sec-
non 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 for the profits
realized from these two sales.
1. Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970).
Emerson purchased 13.2 percent of Dodge's outstanding stock, a total of 152,282 shares,
at $63 per share. Id. at 920.
2. By the first sale Emerson reduced its holding to 9.96 percent. This sale of 37,000
shares was made on August 28, 1967, at $68 per share. In the second sale which was
completed on September 11, 1967, Reliance paid Emerson $69 per share for the remaining
115,282 shares. Id. at 920.
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 US.C. § 78p(b) (1964)-
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by hin from any
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than
six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall mure to and be recoverable by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or if not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding
six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the
owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer
if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after
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The purpose of section 16(b) is to prevent a director, officer or a
more than ten percent beneficial 4 owner of an issuer of equity securities
from unfairly using inside information which he may have obtained due
to his position or substantial ownership of the issuer's securities. 5 Short-
swing profits6 realized by the more than ten percent beneficial owner
may be recovered by the issuer without proof of actual use of inside
information. 7 The statute provides an exemption from section 16(b)
liability for any transaction in which the beneficial owner was less than
a ten percent owner "both at the time of the purchase and sale ,, 8
Emerson contended that the profits in question were exempt from re-
covery since it was not a ten percent beneficial owner "prior to" 9 the
June acquisition.10 The trial court ruled that the phrase "at the time of
purchase" includes the time "simultaneously with"" the purchase and
therefore held that section 16(b) liability attaches to any purchase
where a shareholder acquires a ten percent interest in the issuer.'2 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.'8
Although the subject of considerable conflicting scholarly discus-
sion,14 the question of the proper interpretation of "both at the time
request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such
suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was
realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction
where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transac-
tion or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may
exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
4. The more than ten percent level of ownership requirement is established by
reading the phrase "such beneficial owner" of 16(b) in conjunction with subsection
16(a), which provides in pertinent part: "Every person who is directly or indirectly
the beneficial owner of more than 10 percentum of any class of any equity securi-
ty " Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), i5 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964)
6. Short-swing profits are made from the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of
a stock within six months. W PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 24-25
(1968).
7. Id. The issuer's burden of proof is thus limited to a showing that defendant
stockholder is the owner of more than 10 percent of issuer's stock.
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), i5 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964)
9. 434 F.2d at 922.
10. Id.
11. 306 F Supp. 588, 589 (E.D. Mo. 1969)
12. Id.
13. 434 F.2d at 924.
14. Text and law review authors who are in accord with the Emerson interpretation
include: 2 L. Loss, SEcuiTIEs REGULATION 1060 (2d ed. 1961); Cook and Feldman,
Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HlRv. L. REv. 612, 631 (1953);
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of purchase and sale" has been litigated only twice. The Second Circuit
was first to consider the question in Stella v. Graham-Paige Motor
Corp.15 The majority ruled that the ambiguous phrase was to be con-
strued as meaning "simultaneously with," ", agreeing with the lower
court that any converse construction would defeat the legislative pur-
pose of the enactment.' A dissenting opinion contended that the statu-
tory language was unambiguous and that Congress did not intend for the
subsection to apply to a shareholder who though "a [10%] beneficial
owner at the time of the sale was not such both at the time of the
purchase and sale." 18
The dissenting opinion in Stella was adopted by a district court in
Arkans-s Louisiana Gas Co v. W R. Stephens lnvuest. Co 19 Thus, the
federal courts which have considered the problem are split as to the
proper resolution.
The Emerson court agreed with the majority view in Stella and there-
fore found Emerson Company liable as a more than ten percent share-
holder at the time of sale within the meaning of section 16(b) The
Emerson court then faced the novel issue 2° of whether the profits gained
by the second sale, when Emerson owned less than ten percent of
Dodge's stock, were recoverable by the issuer.21 The trial court had held
that the profits from both sales were recoverable by the issuer. Although
the two sales were separate transactions, the district court treated each
Seligman, Problems under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1934);
57 COLuM. L. Rnv. 287, 289 (1957).
15. 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
16. 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'g 104 F Supp. 957, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
17. Judge Kaufman argued that if the "prior to" interpretation of the exemption
provision were adopted it would defeat the purpose of section 16(b) of preventing ten
percent beneficial owners from using inside information.
It would be possible for a person to purchase a large block of stock, sell it
out until his ownership was reduced to less than 10% and then repeat the
process, ad infinitizon. A construction such as this would provide a way
for the evasion of 16(b) by principal stockholders, and render it largely
ineffective.
104 F Supp. at 959.
The Second Circuit indicated its approval of this rationale. But see 9 STAe. L. Rv.
582 (1957), wherein the student author persuasively argues that the persons Congress
intended to hold liable were those who were 10 percent owners prior to the occurrence
of the transaction in question.
18. 232 F.2d at 303, 305.
19. 141 F Supp. 841, 847 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
20. 434 F.2d at 925.
21. Id.
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sale as part of "one continuous transaction" 22 executed to avoid section
16(b) liability 23 On this point, the circuit court reversed and held that
so long as the two sales were not "legally tied" 24 to each other they
could not b-e treated as one sale regardless of the owner's intent.25 The
circuit court objectively 2 applied the provision of section 16(b) to the
second sale and found its profits exempt from recovery 27
In the ultimate resolution of the proper construction of the exemp-
tion provision of section 16 (b), the Emerson decision provides additional
judicial weight to the interpretation established in the Stella case. Ac-
ceptance of this construction maintains the trend of liberally construing
section 16(b)2 8 and gives limited expansion to the types of transactions
22. The trial court described the sales as a "two step sales procedure" and "two
sales effected pursuant to a single predeternuned plan of disposition." 306 F Supp.
at 592. The phrase "one continuous transaction" is suggested by the circuit court.
434 F.d at 926.
23. The court based its conclusion upon a letter from Emerson's counsel which
outlined ways of profitably disposing of the Reliance stock in the event that the merger
failed.
The intial defensive step is for Emerson to reduce its holding of
Dodge stock to less than 10% From this point on, Emerson, no longer
being a 10% stockowner of Dodge can sell the balance of its Dodge stock
free of any 16(b) risk; provided of course, the second sale is not legally
tied m any way to first sale.
306 F Supp. at 592. The district court also found it significant that negotiations with
Reliance commenced the day after Emerson had made arrangements for the first sale.
The court made it clear, however, that it did not suspect Emerson of a lack of good
faith but it did question its right to avoid section 16(b) liability by a series of sales
when in fact each was part of a plan to dispose of more than a 10 percent holding.
Id. at 592-93.
24. The circuit court did not define what constituted "one continuous transaction,"
but held only that it would not classify as such two independent sales not legally tied
to each other which were made to different buyers at different times. 434 F.2d at 926.
25. The decision did not fault the plaintiff corporation for attempting to avoid the
loss of profits on its second sale of 115,282 shares and equated such conduct to
legally permissible tax avoidance. Id. at 925.
26. One author has discerned a recent trend away from the "objective" method of
applying the provisions of section 16(b). Under the traditional approach, the courts
made no subjective deterrmnation of the use or likelihood of use of inside information
and attached liability to all transactions by statutory insiders within a six month period.
Lowensfeld, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CoRNarEr
L. Rxv. 45 (1968). This author advocates that the subjective approach is the most prac-
tical means of avoiding imposition of loss of profits upon insiders who have not
abused their privileged position. Id. at 64.
27. 434 F.2d at 926.
28. E.g., Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir.
1959); Smolowe v. Delando Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943); Molybdenum
Corp. of America v. International Mimng Corp., 32 F.R.D. 415, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
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subj'ect to its liability The Emerson court, however, retreated from a
possible greater expansion of section 16(b) by its rejection of the lower
court's determination of the nature of the second sale.
The less stringent standard established by the Emerson court creates
a judicial loophole by which the foresighted investor can intentionally
and permissibly avoid considerable loss of profit.29 The wealkness of the
Emerson case, as well as the inherent weakness of section 16(b), 30 is that
it neither establishes a standard which promotes maximum effectual de-
terrence of the misuse of inside information nor permits a distinction
between the culpable and nonculpable insider.3'
DONALD G. OwENs
Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1969); W. PAINTER, SUpra
note 6, at 26.
29. By this ruling, so long as the transactions are not "legally tied," all profits,
whether gamed by inside information or not, on sales by one no longer owning more
than 10 percent are not recoverable under section 16(b).
30. E.g., W PArNER, supra note 6, at 25; Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securties Ex-
rbange Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the
Rats," 52 CORNELL L. REv. 69, 72-73 (1966). See also additional criticisms of the section
made by L. Loss, supra note 14, at 1088; Munter, supra, at 72-77.
31. In Munter, supra note 30, at 100, the author suggests that the insider should "be
allowed to exculpate with proof that he did not possess inside information."
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